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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)0) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:
(1) Whether the Objection filed by Harrington Trucking on April 7,1998, constituted
an answer to Appellee Janet Robins' Petition. This is a question of law, with no deference
being granted to the trial court's decision. Klinger v. Knightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990).
(2) Whether Appellant Harrington Trucking, Inc. filed an answer by October 22,
1998, as directed by the trial court. This is a question of fact, requiring Appellant to
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding. A finding of fact based on
documentary evidence is not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Consolidation Coal Co.
v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 (Utah 1994).
(3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when on December 16, 1998, it
refused to set aside Harrington Trucking's default, even though Harrington never contested
any of the allegations of Janet Robin's Petition, the time for trial had passed, and Janet's
cause of action would be completely foreclosed to her if it not adjudicated before December
29,1999. This issue is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, under which the Court

1

of Appeals will reverse only if there has been abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d
1114 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case:
This case began on December 29, 1997, when Harrington's semi tractor-trailer lost
control on an icy 1-15, crossed the median and killed Dennis Mitchell. Dennis was Janet
Robins' common law husband; they had lived together since 1987. To have her marriage
validated, Janet filed her Verified Petition for Declaration of Common Law Marriage as
required by Utah statute.1 Under statute, Janet's Petition had to be completely adjudicated
within one yearfromthe date the relationship ended. If it were not, the trial court would lose
jurisdiction and Janet could never have her marriage declared valid.
All Dennis Mitchell's known heirs supported Janet's Petition, so they never filed
answers in opposition to it. Seeking to limit its liability, however, Harrington Trucking
moved to intervene. Janet objected to intervention because, among other things, Harrington
had filed no answer or any pleading setting forth its claims or defenses. Time was critical
because Janet had only had a short time for judicial validation of her marriage. Harrington
had admitted on several occasions that it didn't file an answer. Initially, it argued it didn't
have to file an answer and that it needed to conduct discovery so it could file one. The trial
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"Common law" is perhaps somewhat a misnomer, as Utah has enacted statutory provision for
validating unsolemnized marriages. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995).
2

court allowed Harrington's intervention, giving it some time for discovery so it could frame
an answer. The court also imposed a deadline for Harrington to file the answer if it chose
to contest Janet's Petition. Harrington did not file by the court-imposed deadline and so
default was entered. Admitting that it had notfiledan answer as ordered, Harrington moved
to set aside the default based on excusable neglect. At that same time, Harrington late-filed
an answer.
Harrington thenfileda reply memorandum supporting its motion to Set Aside. There,
for the first time, Harrington argued that its "Objection," which was part of its motion to
intervene, was actually a timely answer. It contended this even though that Objection
disputed none of the Petition's allegations and the trial court had directed Harrington to file
an answer when its motion to intervene and that Objection were before the court. Although
Harrington's motion to set aside was timely under Rule 60(b), it scheduled the motion
hearing to fall only seven working days before Janet's case would expire. The trial court
rejected Harrington's arguments and its motion to set aside was denied. Harrington appeals
that denial; it does not appeal the judgment itself.
B. Course of the Proceedings:
Janetfiledher Petition on February 17, 1998. It was unopposed. But on March 24,
1998, Harrington Truckingfiledits motion to intervene, to which Janet objected. On April
7,1998, Harringtonfileda reply memorandum and its Objection to Petition for Declaration
of Common Law Marriage ("Objection"). At the September 18, 1998, hearing on those
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matters, Harrington acknowledged that it had not filed an answer. In light of the short time
frame, the trial court allowed Harrington's intervention and gave it until October 19, 1998,
to conduct discovery so it could determine a factual basis to contest Janet's Petition, if any.
The trial court also explicitly directed Harrington to file an answer by October 22, 1998, if
it was going to file one. Trial was set for November 12, 1998.
Harrington conducted no formal discovery in this case and allowed the October 22nd
deadline to pass without filing anything further. On October 28, 1998, default was entered.
Harrington timely moved to set default aside under Rule 60(b). Its supporting memorandum
acknowledged that it had not filed an answer as directed, but it contended this failure was
excusable neglect. That having been done, however, Harrington set the hearing date for
December 16, 1998 - just 12 calendar days and seven working days before Janet's time
would run out. On November 10, 1998, Harrington filed a reply memorandum supporting
its motion to set aside, where itfirstcontended its April 7 * Objection to Janet's Petition was
actually an answer. Hearing on Harrington's motion to set aside was held on December 16,
1998.
C. Disposition at Trial Court:
At the December 16th hearing, Judge Maughan, sitting for Judge Stirba, informed
counsel that he had read the whole case file. Harrington contended the April 7 * Objection
was actually an answer and its neglect excusable and Judge Maughan heard those
contentions. He focused, however, on Judge Stirba's clear order giving Harrington until
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October 22nd to file a real answer and that Harrington knew it could not rely on the
Objection as an answer. He then focused on the prejudice to Janet that would result if the
default was set aside at such a late date because it would be impossible to try the case before
the statutory time expired. Accordingly, he denied Harrington's Motion to Set Aside. Given
the timing, it was clear that someone was not going to get a trial on the merits - the only
question was whether it should be Janet or Harrington.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

This case arises out of the "common law" marital relationship between Janet

Robins and Dennis Mitchell which commenced on or about April 28, 1987. (R. 1-4.)
2.

That marital relationship abruptly terminated on December 29, 1997, when

Harrington's northbound semi tractor-trailer lost control on 1-15, crossed the median and
struck the southbound pickup in which the Mitchells were traveling. Janet was seriously
injured, but Dennis Mitchell was killed outright. (R. 2,48, 71.)
3.

On February 17, 1998, Janet Robins filed her petition seeking a judicial

declaration validating her marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 (1995). (R.l-28.)
4.

When the action was filed, all the known heirs of Dennis Mitchell filed

affidavits in support of Janet's Petition, affirming their knowledge of the common law
marital relationship and supporting Janet's action to validate the marriage. (R. 5 - 28.)
Thus, no answer controverting the allegations of Janet's Petition was ever filed. (See Index
to Record on Appeal.)

5

5.

Harrington Trucking sought to intervene without filing an answer on the basis

that they had not yet conducted discovery and, thus, had no basis to deny the Petition's
allegations. (R. 38-40.)
6.

Harrington had filed no proposed answer or supporting memorandum.

Therefore, Janet objected to intervention under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c) and UCJA 4-501, on
the basis that Harrington had failed to file a memorandum or any pleading setting forth its
claims or defenses. Without this, Janet would unfairly be required to go to trial without
knowing which of her allegations, if any, were contested. (R. 51.)
7.

Then on April 7, 1998 Harrington filed two pleadings: (1) Harrington

Trucking's Objection to Petition for Judicial Declaration of Common Law Marriage (the
"Objection" or "Harrington's Objection"); and (2) Harrington Trucking's Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Intervene ("Intervention Memorandum"). (R.5890.)
8.

The Intervention Memorandum stated that the nature of a petition for

declaration of common law marriage precluded an answer being filed. (R. 64-65.) It also
stated "to the extent [the trial] court may determine an additional pleading is required"
Harrington was filing [Harrington's Objection] with the reply memorandum.
9.

(R. 65.)

The text of Harrington's Obj ection states:

The basis for this objection is found in the motion to intervene and the accompanying
memoranda filed by movant Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that the facts
and affidavits submitted by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5
6

(Harrington Trucking's Objection to Petitioner for Judicial Declaration of Common Law
Marriage, R. 55, 88.) A copy of Harrington's Objection and Intervention Memorandum is
appended as Appendix A.
10.

Neither the Intervention Memorandum nor the Objection contest any

allegation of Janet's Petition. {See R. 55 - 68.)
11.

All parties, including Harrington Trucking, were aware that Utah Code Ann.

§30-1-4.5(2) (1995) required that adjudication of a common law marriage must be entered
within one year of its termination or it could not be entered at all. {Bunch v. Englehorn, 906
P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995); see R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 pp. 10, 11.)
The First Hearing. September 18. 1998
12.

Against this background, at the hearing on September 18, 1998, Janet argued

that there was no answer on file and no claims at issue. Janet's counsel asked "[w]hat's the
claim or what's the defense . . . it just doesn't appear anywhere." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing
9/18/98 p. 3,11. 1-5.) Again, following Judge Stirba's decision to allow intervention, the
subject of not knowing which allegations were contested came up in the context of the
shortened time for adjudication under the statute. (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 pp. 10-11.)
13.

If Harrington did not intervene, there was no party adverse to Janet's Petition.

(R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 5 11. 20 -22.)
14.

At the hearing, Harrington never contended the Objection was an answer, but

rather argued that it needed to intervene because it "want[ed] the opportunity to explore
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through discovery, whether or not there are valid grounds for the claim in the petition of
common law marriage." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 9.11. 21 - 23.)
15.

Judge Stirba granted Harrington's intervention, allowing it until October 19,

1998, for discovery and until October 22, 1998, tofilean answer - if it then chose to - even
though that would leave Janet very little time to prepare for trial. The trial court stated:
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that 30 days is sufficient for
discovery as to the issue common law marriage. You'll [Harrington will]
have to make this a high priority.... And then — and then there must — at
that point, I would say an answer to the petition if one is intended to be filed
should be filed on or before the 22nd of October so you know exactly what
any claims are.
(R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/99 pp. 15,11. 24-25; 16,11. 1-6 (emphasis added).)
16.

The trial court further instructed the parties that time would not allow for

continuance or delay, stating "[d]on't ask for a continuance on this, you need to get done
what you need to do in that time frame." (R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 18 11. 2-4.)
The Default and Second Hearing of December 16. 1998
17.

When no answer had beenfiledby the October 22nd court-imposed deadline,

Janet took judgment by default. (R. 135-137.) Harrington moved to set aside the default
on the grounds of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b). (R. 123-124.)
18.

Contemporaneously with its October 28, 1998 Motion to Set Aside,

Harrington filed an untimely answer. (Answer to Verified Petition for Judicial Declaration
of Common Law Marriage, R. 129 - 131.) A copy of Harrington's Answer is appended
hereto as Appendix B.
8

19.

In its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Any Default Judgment

or Declaration of Common Law Marriage Entered in This Case ("Supporting
Memorandum"), Harrington again acknowledged that it "inadvertently failed to file an
answer by October 22nd as required by this court's September 18, 1998 Order." (R. 126.)
20.

In its Supporting Memorandum, Harrington further argued that no prejudice

would result to any party if it were allowed to late file its answer. (R. 127.)
21.

Thefirstclaim that Harrington makes that itfileda timely answer is found in

its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment or Declaration
of Common Law Marriage ("Reply Memorandum"), dated November 10, 1998. (R. 160235.)
22.

There Harrington claims its April 7th Objection "was our answer and functions

as an answer to Ms. Robins Petition." (R. 161.)
23.

Even though earlier dates were available, Harrington scheduled its Motion to

Set Aside for hearing on December 16, 1998. (R. 238.) This was 12 calendar days and only
seven working days before Janet's case would expire by statute.
24.

On December 16, 1998, Commissioner Arnett recommended approval of

Harrington's Motion to Set Aside, which was immediately objected to by Janet. Hearing on
that objection was held before the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, who overturned
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation on that same day. (R. 238-241; see R. 294, Tr.
Hearing 12/16/98 (Hearing on Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation.))

9

A copy of that Order is attached a s Appendix C.
25.

Harrington does not argue that the lower court's finding of prejudice to Janet

was in error. See Appellant's Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Harrington's three arguments all contend the trial court erred in not setting aside the
default because it had already filed an answer in the form of Harrington's Objection dated
April 7, 1998. (Appellant's brief p. 6 - 13.) Those arguments all fail simply because that
Objection is not an answer. An answer sets forth the grounds for defense and places at issue
some or all of the allegations of the petition. The Objectionfiledby Harrington denies none
of the Petition's allegations. It merely demurred to the Petition similar to a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Moreover, the trial court, Janet, and even Harrington knew the Objection was not
an answer. Only at the last minute, when it realized its delay strategy would not work did
Harrington raise the spurious argument that its Objection was really an answer.
Even if the Objection were an answer, it contested none of the Petition's allegations
and so they are deemed admitted. Therefore, the only issue before the trial court was
whether the Petition was sufficient to state Janet's cause of action. The trial court reviewed
it, found the Petition sufficient and judgment was proper. Harrington, however, does not
attack that determination, for it has not appealed the judgment itself. Thus, setting aside its
default is meaningless- its "answer" defaulted it by not contesting the Petition's allegations
Harrington cannot now argue the trial court should have set aside its default based
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on "clerical error" under Rule 60(a) for several reasons. Whether an answer was on filed
is a factual matter, not a clerical matter. There were implicit and explicit factual findings
that no answer was on file. Thus, Harrington is required to marshal the evidence supporting
this factual finding if it seeks to attack it. Harrington has not done so. Moreover,
Harrington never asked the Court below for relief under Rule 60(a). That argument cannot
be raised for the first time here on appeal.
The trial court also correctly rejected Harrington's excusable neglect argument under
Rule 60(b). It has never shown what its meritorious defense is. Indeed, it is not raised in
its Objection, which it now claims is its answer. While policy favors allowing litigants their
day in court, setting aside the default would have heaped insurmountable prejudice on Janet.
It would have effectively denied Janet her day in court, which is contrary to the policy especially where it was Harrington, not Janet, that was at fault.
Harrington concedes this insurmountable prejudice to Janet. It neither addresses the
issue in its brief, nor does it marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's factual
finding that prejudice would result to Janet. The trial court properly found that the prejudice
far outweighed allowing Harrington its day in court.
Although Harrington has put a lot of smoke in its bottle, the issues before the Court
can be resolved by resort to two fairly basic legal concepts. The first is, what is an answer?
The second is how does a court determine when neglect is excusable?

11

ARGUMENT
I.

Harrington's Objection of April 7,1998 Was Not an Answer.

Harrington's Objection is not an answer. See R. 55 - 68. An answer is defined as:
a pleading by which defendant endeavors to resist the plaintiffs demand by an
allegation of facts, either denying allegations of plaintiff's complaint or
confessing them and alleging new matter in avoidance, which defendant
alleges should prevent recovery on facts alleged by plaintiff... the answer is
the formal written statement made by a defendant setting forth the grounds of
his defense; corresponding to what in actions under the common law practice
is called the "plea."
Black's Law Dictionary - 5th Ed. (1981) (emphasis added). Answers are governed by Utah
R. Civ. P. 8(b). Whether one is a defendant or an intervenor, some allegation of the petition
or complaint must be denied in order to have an actual controversy for the court to decide.
The trial court recognized this fact, when it noted that even though Harrington sought to
intervene, no one had yet contested Janet's Petition. R. 295, Tr. Hearing 9/18/98 p. 5,1.1.
20 - 22.
Once Judge Stirba granted Harrington's motion to intervene, Harrington became a
party subject to filing an answer under Rule 8(b) if it were going to factually contest the
Petition. That is what the court ordered on September 18,1998. See Provo City v. Hansen,
601 P.2d 141 (Utah 1979) (after various motions were made, the court ruled that applicants
for intervention could intervene and file their answers). But an answer requires that
Harrington to set forth some factual matter at issue. See Has lam v. Has lam, 19 Utah 1, 56
12

P. 243 (1899) (an answer denying a material allegation of a plaintiff s complaint will raise
an issue between the parties). Otherwise, all the trial court is faced with is determining
whether the uncontroverted allegations of the petition are legally sufficient. Stevens v.
Collard, 837 P.2d. 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), modified on other grounds, 863 P.2d 534
(Utah Ct.App. 1993).
Utah case law on exactly what constitutes and answer is sparse - perhaps because it
is so elemental. But see Haslam v. Haslam, supra. Federal practice properly offers
guidance, because Rule 8(b) of the Utah and Federal rules virtually identical. Compare Utah
R. Civ. P. 8(b) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b). This Court can properly "look to the abundant
federal experience in the area for guidance." Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127,
1130 (Utah 1990). Federal Practice and Procedure explains the concept and content of an
answer this way:
Rule 8(b) FRCP is intended to inform a pleader how to challenge and place in
issue some or all of the allegations in the preceding pleading. The provision
directs the author of a responsive pleading whether it be an answer or a reply,
to state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted against him
and to admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies....
A failure to deny an allegation when a responsive pleading is required
results in it being admitted according to Rule 8(d). The theory of Rules 8(b)
and 8(d) is that a defendant's pleading should apprise the opponent of the
allegations in the complaint that stand admitted and will not be in issue at
trial and those that are contested and will require proof to be established to
enable plaintiff to prevail. The pleading of affirmative defenses, as opposed
to denials, is governed by Rule 8(c)
If an answer is not sufficiently definite in nature to give reasonable
notice of the allegations in the complaint sought to be placed in issue, the
averments may be treated as admitted.
13

Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1261 (1990 ed.)
(emphases added).
Thus, Harrington's characterization of its Objection as an answer is hard to fathom.
The text of the Objection stated that the:
basis for this objection is found in the motion to intervene and the accompanying
memoranda filed by movant Harrington Trucking and upon the basis that the facts
and affidavits submitted by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5
R. 55, Appendix A (emphasis added). However, neither it nor the pleadings it refers to deny
or controvert a single allegation of the Petition.2 It merely states that the allegations are
insufficient to make a case for declaration of valid marriage under the statute. Indeed the
Intervention Memorandum filed with the Objection says it will not address the elemental
allegations of the Petition. It states "Harrington Trucking's right to intervene is determined
by examining the effect of this determination, not the elements giving rise to it." R. 61. In
other words, Harrington was expressly not addressing the allegations of the Petition. But,
Utah courts have recognized for a century that an answer must at a minimum deny some
material allegation of the complaint or petition to create an issue. Haslam v. Haslam, 19
Utah 1, 56 P. 243 (1899). Its bald assertions aside, Harrington's Objection is not an answer
to Janet's Petition. Id; Utah R. Civ. P. 8(b).

2

Admittedly, the memorandum makes a strong case for allowing intervention. That, however, is not
the same as contesting the Petition's allegations.
14

Since the Objection was never an answer, the trial court properly ordered Harrington
tofileone if it was going to contest Janet's Petition. Harrington knew no proper answer was
on file. Indeed, the trial court had the Objection before it when it ordered Harrington to
answer by October 22, 1998. Janet's counsel repeatedly asked what Harrington's claims
were. Harrington itself represented to the trial court that it was not responding to the
"elements giving rise to" Janet's claim and that no answer could be filed. R. 61, 64-65.
Harrington did not file an answer and, accordingly, the trial court correctly entered default
and later correctly refused to set that default aside.
II.

Even if Harrington's Objection Were Considered an Answer, Default
Was Proper.

This court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, whether relied
on by the trial court or not. DeBry v. Noble 889 P.2d 428,444, (Utah 1995). Thus, another
way to view this case is to look at what follows if Harrington's Objection is treated as its
answer. If so, there would be only one legal issue because Harrington's Objection denies
none of the factual allegations. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(d). That issue is: with its allegations taken
as true, does the Petition meet the statutory requirements? The Objection, and the pleadings
it refers to, do not suggest why Janet's petition is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5. The Objection simply says the Petition does not satisfy the
statute. At best it is a bare Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
But, in rendering a default the trial court must first conclude the allegations of the
petition are legally sufficient. Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
15

modified on other grounds 863 P.2d. 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is nothing in the
record to indicate the trial court shirked that duty. And, in fact, a review of the Petition
shows it is sufficient on its face. See R. 1-28. Thus, the trial court properly entered default
judgment and, just as properly, refused to set it aside. The Petition was sufficient and
Harrington's Objection put no facts in issue.
Furthermore, Harrington never moved for dismissal below under Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Nor has it appealed the judgment itself. It chose not to, but rather sought to set
aside the default under Rule 60 (b).3 Therefore, any claim that the Petition was legally
deficient has been laid to rest and Harrington, having been dilatory, having failed to contest
any of the allegations, and having failed to appeal the judgment itself, should not be allowed
to use this "side door" to foreclose Janet's cause of action.
III.

Harrington Concedes Setting Aside the Default Would Prejudice Janet
and the Trial Court Properly Balanced That Prejudice With Policy
Favoring Trial on The Merits.

Harrington originally argued that the trial court should have set aside its default under
Rule 60(b), an argument it renews on appeal. Like ignoring the 500 lb. gorilla in the room,
however, Harrington has never argued that setting aside the default would not unduly
prejudice Janet. Therefore, its Rule 60(b) argument must fail.
Our Supreme Court has adopted a four part test to determine when neglect is
3

An argument can be constructed that Harrington consciously chose not to appeal
because that was more likely to toll the one year adjudication window created by the statute whereas
the application to set aside the default would not have the same tolling effect. Perhaps it is paranoia,
but the question remains.
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excusable:
"[i] the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving party], [ii] the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [iv] whether the
movant acted in good faith.1'
West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337, 340-341 (Utah 1997) (bracketing included), quoting
City ofChanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir.l994)(quoting
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1191, 115 S.Ct. 1254,
131 L.Ed.2d 135 (1995)). This Court has applied similar factors in the context of dismissals
for failure to prosecute the Court considers to determine whether neglect is excusable.
Those factors are:
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to
move the case forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case
forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused
to the other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from
the dismissal.
Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Utah State University Dept. of Agriculture and Applied
Science, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted, emphases added).
Thus, prejudice to the nonmoving party and the parties' respective conduct are recurring
themes.
It is clear from the record that inter alia Judge Maughan refused to grant Harrington's
motion because to do so would irreparably prejudice Janet, who had done nothing wrong.
(See argument regarding lack of meritorious defense below.) Moreover, he made a factual
finding that the trial court's schedule and that of counsel made it impossible to try the case
17

within the one year time required by statute without prejudicing the petitioner and creating
undue hardship. R. 255; R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98 p. 29. To challenge that factual
finding of the trial court on appeal, Harrington must marshal all the evidence supporting the
trial court's fact finding and then demonstrate why the finding is in error. This Court has
put it thus:
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them
'clearly erroneous.'"
Campbell v. Box Elder Co., 962 P. 2d 806, 808 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998) quoting Valcarce v.
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997). Harrington has not marshaled any evidence
regarding the prejudice to Janet.
Harrington does not dispute this factual finding, hoping that (like the gorilla) it will
go away. But without addressing it, it cannot show how its neglect can be excused, which
is its burden. It has not marshaled any evidence as it is required to do. The trial court's
finding of prejudice to Janet is adequately supported in the record. Having failed to properly
dispute the finding of prejudice, Harrington cannot show the trial court's refusal to set aside
the default was an abuse of discretion.
Moreover, Judge Maughan properly balanced this prejudice against the policy
favoring trial on the merits, finding that the prejudice to Janet outweighed that policy. In
fact, under the unusual circumstances of this case, that policy supported denial of
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Harrington's Motion to Set Aside. Had the motion to set aside been granted on December
16, 1998, the court likely could not try the matter by December 28, 1998.4 Accordingly,
there could be no trial on the merits for Janet, who had done nothing wrong. She would
never get her day in court although it was Harrington's neglect that created the delay. That
is not excusable neglect on Harrington's part. West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d at 340-341
(Utah 1997); Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Such a result
is unconscionable and the trial court knew it. In short, because of Harrington's neglect,
someone was not going to get their day in court and the trial court determined it should be
Harrington rather than Janet.
Moreover, Harrington fails (still) to set forth any meritorious defense, which is
required to set aside default under Rule 60(b). Erickson v. Schenkers International
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994). It claims it has one and directs this Court
to "subpoenas and other records which indicate there is a meritorious defense." Appellant's
Brief p. 16; see R. 68 - 90 (the "subpoenas and other records"). But subpoenas and records
do not a meritorious defense make. Perhaps Janet's counsel are slow, but they have not
divined what it is. And although it is Harrington's burden to show it, Harrington holds its
nature close to it breast. It never tells the trial court or this Court what it is and review of
the record does not disclose a meritorious defense either. R. 68-90.

4

Even had the Court been able to try the matter by then, Janet would nonetheless been
prejudiced. Only seven working days remained at that point, one of which was Christmas Eve.
Many witnesses were likely unavailable and her counsel had other matters pending.
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Finally, Harrington chose the timing and one has to question whether it "timely"
pursued its remedy. Admittedly, Harrington timely filed its motion to set aside its default
on October 28,1998. But having done so, it did not seek an expedited resolution. And why
should it? Counsel for Harrington conceded that he scheduled the hearing on that motion
just 12 days before the adjudication deadline, even though earlier hearing dates were
available. R. 294, Tr. 12/16/98 Hearing pp. 19-20. That did not increase the "excusability"
of Harrington's neglect.
IV.

Harrington Has Failed to Marshall The Evidence to Attack the Court's
Factual Finding That No Answer Was Filed.

The trial court found on three occasions that there was no answer file, which is an
issue of fact. Although Harrington bases all three of its arguments on the factual assertion
that it had actually filed an answer, it devotes a mere three lines to the factual part of that
claim. Those three lines simply recite that Harrington also filed a separate objection or
"answer" on April 7, 1998.5 Appellant's Brief p. 4. To challenge a factual finding of the
trial court on appeal, one must marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's fact
finding and then demonstrate why the finding is in error. See Campbell v. Box Elder Co,,
962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) supra (allocating burden to appellants to marshal
evidence supporting a factual finding if attacking it on appeal). Harrington has wholly
failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that there was no answer.

5

Whether that objection constituted an "answer" is a question law, dealt with previously.
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The trial court made findings that no answer was on file, not once, but three times.
Thefirstoccurred implicitly at hearing on September 18, 1998 when Judge Stirba ordered
that an answer be filed by October 22 nd if one was going to be filed; The second when
default entered on October 28,1998; And the third when Harrrington's Motion to Set Aside
was heard on December 16, 1998.
On September 18, 1998, the Court had Harrington's Objection before it - indeed, it
was part of the issue of the day.6 The court allowed Harrington's intervention and ordered
it to file an answer on or before October 22, 1998 "if one is to be filed." The reason for the
order is likewise clear. In order for a case or controversy to exist, at least one material
allegation of the Petition must be controverted. Harrington's Objection merely questions
the sufficiency of the petition. Thus, when Janet's counsel directed the trial court's attention
to the lack of a sufficient answer, Judge Stirba correctly ruled that if Harrington was going
to actually contest Janet's Petition, an answer must befiledprior to October 22 nd .
On October 28th, when the court entered Harrington's default, it was based on the
explicit finding that Harrington had failed to answer as ordered by the Court. That factual
finding is supported by the record and ample evidence. R. 132, 135; R. 295, Tr. Hearing
9/18/98. Finally, on December 16,1998, Judge Maughan heard Harrington's argument that
it had already filed an answer. See e.g. R. 294, Tr Hearing 12/16/98 pp. 15 - 16. He had
6

It must be presumed that Judge Stirba read the file prior to the September hearing and was aware
of the objection and its contents. Clearly Judge Maughan had when he denied Harrington's Motion to Set
Aside Default on December 16,1998, for he explicitly said so on the record. R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98
p.4 11. 21, 22.
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read the entire case file. R. 294, Tr. Hearing 12/16/98 p.411.21 - 22, p. 28 11. 1-3. So he had
Harrington's Objection. R. 88-93. The simple fact is, no evidence was presented to the
court that an answer was on file
V.

Harrington Cannot Seek Relief Under Rule 60(a).

Harrington now argues that it should be granted relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
60(a). Its premise is that there was a clerical mistake about whether an answer was on file.
That is specious because as noted above, the Court made implicit and explicit factual
findings that no answer had been filed. See R. 135. That was a correct judicial finding of
fact, which Harrington has not properly attacked. Rule 60(a) is not applicable for resolution
of factual disputes. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a); see Lindsay v. Atkin., 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984).
Furthermore, Harrington never argued this in the trial court. It cannot raise it for the
first time here. That has been decided in the context of Rule 60(a) by this Court in Richins
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382 (Utah App. 1991). In that case, the
defendant's motion for relief under rule 60(b) was untimely and denied. He argued for the
first time on appeal that the trial court also could have granted his motion under Rule 60(a)
or under its "inherent authority." This Court declined to consider those arguments because
they were raised for the first time on appeal. Richins ,817 P.2d at 387; see Franklin
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) (generally, issues
raised for the first time in post-judgment motions are raised too late to be reviewed on
appeal). Harrington cannot raise its Rule 60(a) motion for the first time on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly refused to set aside the default judgment. Harrington's
Objection was not an answer as it puts no fact at issue. Even if it was an answer, default was
proper because, without a factual dispute, the only question before the trial court was
whether Janet's cause of action was properly pleaded. Harrington never raised that issue
before the trial court or on appeal. Moreover, because it has not marshaled the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, Harrington has not properly appealed the trial court's
finding that no answer was on file. Nor has it properly appealed the finding that undue
hardship and prejudice would inure to Janet. Harrington's neglect was not excusable.
Harrington has not tendered a meritorious defense and has not shown how the prejudice to
Janet could be surmounted. In fact, the trial court would have abused its discretion if it had
set aside the default. Janet, who was without fault would have lost her day in court
completely.
DATED this /3

day of September, 1999.
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.

Attorneys for Appellee / Petitioner
Janet Robins
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of:
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

HARRINGTON TRUCKING'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
MOTION TO INTERVENE
,/>•-, n O f /

Cj^-fW(c^^~l

Civil No. -9*4-^©ir2T~
Judge Anne M. Stirba

COMES

NOW

Harrington

Trucking,

the

intervener, and

submits the following reply memorandum in support of its motion to
intervene as a defendant.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Suit has been filed against Harrington Trucking in a

separate action arising from an accident involving Janet C. Robins
(Mitchell), Dennis L. Mitchell, and Harrington Trucking.

This

matter was filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Civil No. 980901125 on behalf of Lindsy
Mitchell.

(See Attachment "A", Complaint.)

2.

Janet C. Robins, through James A. Mclntyre, her

attorney has filed a petition seeking appointment as guardian of
Lindsy Lee Mitchell.
Court

in and

983900264.

This matter was filed in the Third District

for Salt Lake
(See Attachment

County,
U

State of Utah, Civil No.

B" , Petition

for Appointment

of

Guardian and Conservator of Minor.)
3.

Harrington Trucking has filed a motion to stay the

proceedings in the wrongful death matter until the controversy over
who will be representing the interests in Lindsy Mitchell has been
resolved.
4.
included

In the instant matter, counsel for Janet C. Robins,

counsel

for

Harrington

Trucking

in

the

mailing

certificate, thereby advising it of petitioner's intention to have
Mr. Robins declared the common law wife of Dennis L. Mitchell.
(See Attachment

U

C", Mailing Certificate to Petition.)

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
HARRINGTON TRUCKING HAS PROVIDED
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING
STANDING AND RIGHT TO INTERVENE.
In evaluating Harrington Trucking's right to intervene,
the issue of standing is not determined through an evaluation of
the Utah common-law marriage statute, § 30-1-1-4.5, U.C.A.

The

case law interpreting an individual's right to intervene pending
litigation examines the requirements of Rule 24 of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure instead.

Petitioner seeks to draw attention away

from the requirements of Rule 24 by alleging that her action before
this

court

is contractual

petition is illustrative.

in nature.

An

examination

of

the

Neither in the petition nor in the

affidavits submitted in support of her petition does petitioner
assert any claims sounding in contract.

It is obvious petitioner

seeks a judicial declaration that she and the decedent complied
with the requirements of § 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annot. As such, she
seeks the status of a common law spouse of the decedent by action
of the court.

3

Certainly the requirements of § 30-1-4.5 are important in
that

determination.

intervene

is

However,

determined

by

Harrington
examining

Trucking's

the

effects

right
of

to

this

determination, not the elements giving rise to it.
If Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
the basis for standing, Harrington Trucking need not be a party to
the alleged contract or to the common law marriage in order to be
granted right to intervene.
POINT II.
HARRINGTON TRUCKING IS ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Both the specific wording of Rule 24 and the applicable
case

law

efforts.

interpreting

this

rule

support

Harrington

Rule 24(a) states in part:
Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest. (Emphasis added.)

4

Trucking's

A primary case in Utah interpreting Rule 24 is Lima v.
Chambers, 657 P. 2d 279

(Utah 1982) .

That case was analyzed in

light of Rule 24, and the court held:
[A] n applicant must be allowed to intervene if
four requirements are met: (1) the application
is timely; (2) the applicant has an interest
in the subject matter of the dispute; (3) that
interest
is
or
may
be
inadequately
represented; and (4) the applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action.
657 P.2d at 282.
In light of those factors, the court then ruled that an
insurer who had provided uninsured motorist coverage was entitled
to intervene in the litigation between its insured and a tort
feasor.
Earlier

case

law

in

Utah

has

elaborated

on

these

essential elements. For example, in Commercial Block Realty Co. v.
United State Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 83 Utah 414, 28 P.2d 1081,
1083 (1934), the court ruled that for a party to intervene:
he must have an interest in the matter in
litigation, in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both.
It

is

clear

from

this

language

that

the

right

to

intervene shall be granted if the necessary requirements of Rule 24

are met even though doing so may be adversarial to those involved
in the underlying litigation.
Later, in Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d
1101 (Utah App. 1990), the court again affirmed that
The test usually applied to the right to
intervene is whether the person seeking to
intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal
operation and the effect of the judgment.
(Cite omitted.)
797 P.2d at 1108.
Finally, in Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255

(Utah

1997), the Supreme Court acknowledged that Rule 24 has been changed
and discussed the effects of the amendment.

They held:

Instead of requiring applicants to show that
they will be "bound by a judgment in the
action", the rule now requires applicants to
demonstrate only that "the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter
impair or
impede
[their]
ability
to protect
that
interest" . Thus the test of Rule 24 now
mandates intervention on even more liberal
terms than it did when we issued Lima.
938 P.2d at 258.
The

Chatterton

court

acknowledged

intervene is not without its limits.

that

the right to

Those limitations on the

scope and right to intervene

6

I ->

are expressed by the rule itself and are
related primarily to the scope
of the
intervener's interests and the timeliness of
the intervener's application after adequate
notice of the action.
398 P.2d at Footnote 5.
Nowhere in the memorandum in opposition of Harrington
Trucking's

motion

to

intervene

does

the petitioner

deny

that

Harrington Trucking will both be bound by the determination of
common law spouse status sought by the petitioner or could have
additional exposure in the wrongful death claim by virtue of such
a determination.
In

light

of

the

Supreme

Court's

determination

that

intervention should now be more liberally allowed, and in light of
petitioner's

tacit

acknowledgment

that

Harrington

Trucking's

interests are at stake in this matter, all the requirements of Rule
24(a) have been met by intervener.
POINT III.
RULE 24(c) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE HAVE ESSENTIALLY BEEN MET.
The requirements of Rule 24 (c) have application where a
responsive pleading setting forth claims or affirmative defenses
would be required.

Inasmuch as petitioner has filed no complaint,
7

no answer setting forth claims or defense is allowed.

At most,

pleadings setting forth objections to the petition are required.
Intervener's motion meets that requirement.
To the extent this court may determine an additional
pleading

is

required,

enclosed

please

find

as

Attachment

D

intervener's objection.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner,

through

her

objection

to

Harrington

Trucking's motion, has sought to characterize Harrington Trucking's
efforts as "unconscionable".

In doing so, petitioner misconstrues

the purpose of Rule 24. As with all litigation, it is adversarial.
Harrington Trucking's basis for intervention is Rule 24(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

While petitioner may neither agree

with nor like Rule 24, it is clearly not unconscionable.
Consistent with the earlier appellate court decisions on
intervention,- the Chatterton court noted in Footnote 9 that "Rule
24(a) makes clear that intervention is granted for the intervener's
own interests ... ."

It is absurd for petitioner to suggest that

Harrington Trucking seeks to represent the decedent's interest in
this matter.

Harrington Trucking is adverse to the heirs and

8

estate of Mr. Mitchell.

Because its interests are at issue in this

claim and because Harrington Trucking's interest is not adequately
represented by the existing parties, it is entitled as a matter of
right to intervene in this matter.
Therefore, Harrington Trucking respectfully requests this
court enter an order allowing it to intervene in opposition to
petitioner.
DATED this

" 7 * — — day of April, 1998.
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage

lid
prepaid, this

/

day of April, 1998, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to the following:
Attorney for Petitioner:
James A. Mclntrye, Esq.
McINTRYE & GOLDEN, L.C.
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna:
David E. Sloan, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorneys for Lindsy Mitchell:
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
5684 south Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
Preston L. Handy, Esq.
SIEGFRIED Sc JENSEN
5684 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123

Janet C. Robins
10316 South Violet Drive
Sandy, UT 84 094
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Arlene Grego
1153 West 12400 South
Riverton, UT 84065
Willard Mitchell
10563 South North Forty Way
South Jordan, UT 84095
Steve Mitchell
1473 East Greenfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Penny Mitchell
1028 West Learned Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

98-085D
MITCHELL\REPLY MEMO
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C,
Attorneys for Intervener
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

HARRINGTON TRUCKING'S OBJECTION
TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGI.:

^

tfrfloii&S

Civil No. <$%*&
Judge Anne M. Stirba

COMES NOW Harrington Trucking and objects to the petition
for judicial declaration of common law marriage

filed in this

matter by Janet Robins Mitchell.
The basis for this objection is found in the motion to
intervene and the accompanying memoranda filed by movant Harrington
Trucking and upon the basis that the facts and affidavits submitted
by petitioner are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Utah
Code Annot. § 31-1-4.5.

DATED this

V

day of April, 1998.
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

SCOTT W.(CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this ' I-^

day of April, 1998, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to the following:
Attorney for Petitioner:
James A. Mclntrye, Esq.
McINTRYE & GOLDEN, L.C.
360 East 4500 South, Ste. 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna:
David E. Sloan, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorneys for Lindsy Mitchell:
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
5684 south Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
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Preston L. Handy, Esq.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
5684 South Green Street
Murray, UT 84123

Janet C. Robins
10316 South Violet Drive
Sandy, UT 84094

Arlene Grego
1153 West 12400 South
Riverton, UT 84065
Willard Mitchell
10563 South North Forty Way
South Jordan, UT 84095
Steve Mitchell
1473 East Greenfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Penny Mitchell
1028 West Learned Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

98-085D
MITCHELL\OBJECTION
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, P.C.
Attorneys for Harrington Trucking, Inc.
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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Third J Jriicif! District

Deputy 3!ork

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAL

COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of:
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION
FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
Civil No. 984901224
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Intervener, Harrington Trucking,

Inc., hereby answers and

contests Janet Robins Mitchell's Verified Petition for Judicial
Declaration of Common Law Marriage as follows:
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
1.

Intervener denies that Janet Robins Mitchell was co-

habitating

as the common law wife of Dennis L. Mitchell, but

otherwise admits paragraph 1 of petitioner's Petition.

29,

2.

Intervener denies paragraph 2 of petitioner's Petition.

3.

Intervener denies paragraph 3 of petitioner's Petition.

4.

Intervener admits that Dennis L. Mitchell died on December

1997/

however,

intervener

denies

each

and

every

other

allegation in paragraph 4 of petitioner's petition.
5.

Intervener denies paragraph 5 of petitioner's Petition.

6.

Intervener denies paragraph 6 of petitioner's Petition.

7.

Intervener denies paragraph 7 of petitioner's Petition.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Petitioner's request is barred by the doctrines of laches and
estoppel.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's Petition fails to state the elements of common
law marriage as required by Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5.
Therefore, intervener, Harrington Trucking, Inc., respectfully
requests

that

petitioner's

Petition be

denied

and

this

court

determine as a matter of law that Janet Robins Mitchell was not the
common law wife of Dennis Mitchell.
Respectfully submitted this ^T^ydj^y

of October, 1998.

HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE

*T
X)TT W. CHRISTENSEN)
(ttorneys for Intervener
larrington Trucking, Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid,
thi

day of October, 1998, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to the following:

-2-

Attorney for Petitioner:
James A. Mclntyre
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
360 East 4500 South, Ste 3
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Attorney for Rebecca Colonna:
David E. Sloan, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Ms. Lindsay Mitchell
C/o Janet C. Robins
10316 South Violet Drive
Sandy, UT 84094
James R. Boud, Esq.
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER & BOUD, P.C.
765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l
Sandy, UT 84094
Attorney for Arlene Grego
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APPENDIX C

FILED DISTRICT COURT

JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-3399

Third Judicial District

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of •

DEFAULT CERTIFICATE

DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

Civil No. 984901:>24
Honorable Anne M . Stirba

In this action the Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, Inc.,
having been instructed to file an Answer by October 22, 1998, in
the Minutes Oral Argument Notice dated September 18, 1998, the
Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, Inc., having failed to file an
Answer to Petitioner's Verified Petition for Judicial Declaration
of Common Law Marriage on file herein, and the Estate of Dennis L.
Mitchell, having accepted service of the Petition for Judicial
Declaration of Common Law Marriage on March 12, 1998, the time
allowed by law for answering having expired, the default of the
Estate

of

Dennis

Mitchell,

and

said

Intervenor,

Harrington

Trucking, Inc., in the premises is hereby duly entered according to

law.
ATTEST my hand, and the seal of said Court, this < r ^ ^ ^

of

QckHC

day

, 193&.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFAULT CERTIFICATE to the following
on this

J ^ t h

day of October, 1998.

Ci/v\cUh^m-^
David E. Sloan
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Michael F. Richman
Attorney at Law
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Preston L. Handy
Siegfried & Jensen
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123

2

Scott W. Christensen
Mark J. Williams
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, Suite #500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Janet C. Robins
10316 South Violet Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Arlene Greco
1153 West 12400 South
Riverton, Utah 84065
Willard Mitchell
10563 South North Forty Way
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Steve Mitchell
1473 East Greenfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Penny Mitchell
1028 West Learned Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3
-Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-3399
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In re: The Marriage of:

DEFAULT JUDGMENT & JUDICIAL
DECLARATION
OF COMMON
LAW
MARRIAGE

DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL.

Civil No. 984901224
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

The Estate of Dennis Mitchell and the Intervenor, Harrington
Trucking, having failed to plead or otherwise defend in this action
and default having been entered.
IT

IS

ORDERED

that

Petitioner

is

granted

a

Judicial

Declaration of Common Law Marriage.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED that all persons entitled to
notice have received notice, and the Default Certificate having
been entered on

, the union of Dennis L. Mitchell and

Janet Robins Mitchell is hereby declared a common law marriage,

legal, binding and valid, nunc pro tunc, as of April 28, 1987.
DATED this

2-8

day of Q c | p ^ _ _ _ , 1 9 6 8 .
BY THE COURT;

District Court Jud-#^S-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage pre-paid, a true and
correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

DEFAULT

JUDGMENT

&

JUDICIAL

DECLARATION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE to the following on this
day of October, 1998.

]

rt/yidJA/)d-r^y

David E. Sloan
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Michael F. Richman
Attorney at Law
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Preston L. Handy
Siegfried & Jensen
5684 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123

2

£>"^

Scott W. Christensen
Mark J. Williams
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
4 Triad Center, Suite #500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Janet C. Robins
10316 South Violet Drive
Sandy, Utah 84094
Arlene Greco
1153 West 12400 South
Riverton, Utah 84065
Willard Mitchell
10563 South North Forty Way
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Steve Mitchell
1473 East Greenfield Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Penny Mitchell
1028 West Learned Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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APPENDIX D

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000O000

In re: The Marriage of:

Case No. 984901224

DENNIS L. MITCHELL and
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL,

Supreme Court No.: 990187-SC

Appellee,

Videotape

HARRINGTON TRUCKING, INC.,

Judge Paul Maughn
FILED DISTRICT COUR

Defendant in
Intervention and
Appellant

Third Judicial District

APR 0 2 TO
/$AkT LAKEBl
By i-^^yfc-^ft^y\ S T

000O000

feT»yttt»Bwrk

The Videotape Transcript of the proceedings held on
the 16th, day of December, 1998, before Janet Loveless, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional
Reporter, Utah License No. 356646, and Notary Public in and
for the State of Utah.
oooOooo

A
ASSOCIATED

R

PROI-HSSIONAI.

R F P O R r r. R S , L. c.

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR JANET ROBINS MITCHELL:
James A. Mclntyre
MCINTYRE & GOLDEN
360 East 4500 South, #3
Murray, Utah 84107
FOR HARRINGTON TRUCKING:
Jason M. Kerr
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. BOX 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
oooOooo

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

Good morning, counsel.

I appreciate

3

your willingness to come here on such short time.

4

you appreciate the Court's willingness as well.

5
6

Would you state your appearances for the record,
please.

7
8

MR. MCINTYRE:

Your Honor, James Mclntyre for

Janet Robins Mitchell, the petitioner in this matter.

9

THE COURT:

10
11

I hope

MR. KERR:

Okay.
Jason Kerr, for intervenor Harrington

Trucking.

12

THE COURT:

13

So you've had an order today, a recommended— is

14

Thank you, Mr. Kerr.

it an order or recommendation?

15

MR. MCINTYRE:

The way that this procedure

16

normally works, your Honor, is that the Commissioner makes a

17

recommendation, there is an objection filed, which--

18

THE COURT:

Right, which puts it before—

19

MR. MCINTYRE:

Which puts it before you, and so

20

it's not yet an order of the Court.

21

announced, it becomes an order of the Court during the

22

interim.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. MCINTYRE:

25

THE COURT:

Although, once it's

Until it's changed, that's right.
Right.

So you want t o —

1
2

MR. MCINTYRE:

It's my burden to go forward, in

terms of who proceeds.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. MCINTYRE:

5

perhaps it would be helpful to--

6

THE COURT:

You may do so.
Thank you.

Your Honor, I think

Before you begin, let me just make for

7

the record that we're dealing with the case of Mitchell

8

vs.-- what is it?

9

MR. MCINTYRE:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. MCINTYRE:

12

THE COURT:

13

It is actually in the matter of.

In the matter of?
Correct.

In the matter of in re the marriage of

Dennis Mitchell and Janet Robins Mitchell, is that correct?

14

MR. MCINTYRE:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. MCINTYRE:

That is correct.

Case #984901224.

You may proceed.

Thank you, your He nor.

Your Honor,

17

I think that :I'm going to proceed a little bit differently,

18

if that ' s all right.

19

to take a loo]k at the background of how we get to this

20

point.

21
22

THE COURT:

I think that perhaps it would be well

You may do so briefly.

I've read the

whole f.lie so —

23

MR. MCINTYRE:

I understand.

24

THE COURT:

25

clarifi cation , you may do so.

But you can.

If you want

1

MR. MCINTYRE:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MCINTYRE:

May I come forward?

You may.
What I have done is I've copied the

4

provision of the statute that we will be proceeding under

5

because it is somewhat unusual.

6

valid marriage that hasn't been solemnized, you have to

7

prove the five elements that have traditionally represented

8

a common law marriage, but the legislature has thrown a

9

wrinkle in it.

In terms of determining a

And that wrinkle is found in paragraph 2,

10

which says, "The determination or establishment of a

11

marriage under this section must occur during the

12

relationship described in section 1 or within one year

13

following the termination of that relationship.

14

a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested

15

in any form and may be proved under the same general rules

16

of evidence as are facts in other cases."

17
18

Evidence of

And our appellate courts have had occasion to make
rulings on that particular section.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. MCINTYRE:

And if I may?

You may.
The case is called Bunch vs.

21

Hagelhorn.

And if I may summarize that to the Court, w h a t —

22

essentially what this case says, and what the cases upon

23

which it is based say, is the legislature meant exactly what

24

it said, this is a statute of repose to the ultimate, in the

25

sense that i f — the Court must make its determination within

1

that one-year period of time.

2

In this case, my client's husband was killed in an

3

automobile accident between Harrington Trucking and the

4

vehicle in which he was riding, on December 29th, 1997.

5

Which means that we have until-- as I've read the statute

6

and as other practitioners that I've spoken with read the

7

statute, that means within gives us until December 28th,

8

1998 to have a determination made, a declaration of this

9

valid marriage made.

10

That issue was raised before Judge Stirba in the

11

hearing that we had in September on the objection to the

12

commissioner's recommendation allowing intervention, and at

13

that time, Judge Stirba entered a very specific order. And

14

that order, if I may, says, "The Court orders discovery to

15

be completed by October 19th.

16

file an answer by October 22nd if they intend to do so. And

17

this case is set for evidentiary hearing on November 12th at

18

9:30 a.m. "

19

Respondents are instructed to

They did not file an answer.

At the time that

20

Judge Stirba entered that order, I nad notified the Court

21

and counsel for Harrington Trucking.

22

file.

23

had actually served the estate of Dennis Mitchell as the

24

proper party to be served, and not surprisingly, they didn't

25

answer objecting to it.

There was no answer on

What we had done in this case is we had sent out— we

We sent copies of the pleadings to

1

every heir,of Dennis Mitchell and to Harrington Trucking.

2

Harrington Trucking is the only party-- the only person that

3

was actually given notice of this proceeding who responded

4

in any way.

5

THE COURT:

Why did you send notice to Harrington?

6

MR. MCINTYRE:

Because we felt that it was

7

important to them to have that notice because if they were

8

going to intervene, they could intervene or try to.

9

came into court, asked to intervene.

They

And under the rules of

10

intervention, they're not required to file an answer.

11

if they don't file an answer, then they must rely upon the

12

answer that's filed by someone else.

13

was no answer filed whatsoever.

14

But

In this case, there

So when Judge Stirba uttered the words, If you

15

intend to file an answer, you need to do it by October 22nd.

16

What was meant by that is without an answer, a default will

17

be entered because there's nobody that's contravening,

18

nobody that's objecting to the declaration of this valid

19

marriage other than Harrington Trucking.

20
21
22

And Janet Mitchell

J is not left with any way to know what is controverted and
what is not.
Now, why in the world anyone would controvert that

23

Janet Mitchell had the right to consent to a valid marriage

24

or that she was under any impediment of entering into a

25

marriage is beyond me.

But the answer that was ultimately

1

filed, Harrington Trucking did that because they say they

2

didn't have an opportunity to conduct discovery.

3

All of the discovery that they did conduct, with

4

the exception of what I voluntarily provided to them—

5

because at that hearing or following that hearing, I spoke

6

with Mr. Williams and said, Look, I'll have my client gather

7

together everything that she can gather and we'll give to it

8

to you, which we did do.

9

Harrington Trucking conducted was conducted in a wrongful

All the other discovery that

10

death case.

11

this case.

12

to answer this Complaint because we didn't have the

13

opportunity to conduct discovery.

14

They didn't conduct one bit of discovery in
But their claim is, Gee, we didn't have a chance

But they never did it.

Discovery was ordered to be completed by the 19th

15

and I was ordered to cooperate with that, which I feel I

16

fully did.

17

Court and the Court entered a default judgment.

18

sent them notice that we were going in and applying for that

19

default judgment.

20

they never would have filed an answer.

21

notice in, they then filed an answer the same day that the

22

default is entered.

23

They didn't file an answer, and we asked the
We also

Which I think if we hadn't done that,
But we sent the

Your Honor, the rules— Rule 60(b) is quite clear.

24

Rule 60(b) is a rule of equity.

25

requirements.

And Rule 60(b) has three

It has a requirement that a motion to set

1

aside be timely filed, that there will be excusable neglect,

2

and that there be a meritorious defense alleged.

3

commissioner found that those three things were there.

4

problem with that is the commissioner completely disregarded

5

the rule of equity, that there not be prejudice to the

6

nonmoving party.

The
The

In this case we 1 re faced with a situation where

7
8

today is the 16th of December.

If looking at the Court's

9

calendar, it appears that we would have two days left in

10

this week, we would have four days of next week and we would

11

have one day of the following week in which the Court could

12

make a determination.

13

is a party to this action could accommodate that kind of a

14

schedule.

15

That is, assuming that everybody who

We had a trial date that was set before this Court

16

that we could have had a hearing, had Harrington filed the

17

answer that they should have.

18

neglect, but they knew they had those deadlines.

19

now sitting in a position where, quite frankly, I filed my

20

Affidavit and my Affidavit is-- I asked my secretary to look

21

at my calendar and see what days I have available.

22

that all of next week is basically taken up with a trial

23

before Judge Iwasaki.

24

all day tomorrow.

25

canceled, I have hearings all day tomorrow.

They're claiming excusable
And we're

I know

I have a hearing-- I have hearings

I have-- at least, unless it's been
I may have some

time on the 18th and I may have some time on the 28th.

But

the problem is we also have witnesses that we have to get
together.
Wefve now shifted the burden from Harrington
Trucking to set aside the default, we've shifted the burden
back to Janet Mitchell on an extremely abbreviated basis.
THE COURT:

Let me ask this question.

Why was the

trial-- or the hearing set in November, why wasn't that
addressed sooner than today?

It was struck on the default,

but what's happened between-MR. MCINTYRE:

Not a thing.

Why it was ever

scheduled in front of the commissioner instead of the Court,
that's a jurisdictional question that I haven't even got
into.

But, quite frankly, I don't know how the commissioner

has jurisdiction over this matter.

This is not one of those

matters that the-- that the rules allow the commissioner to
have jurisdiction over.

The commissioner's jurisdiction is

limited to divorces, adoptions, paternity actions, those
sorts of.things.

But declarations of marriage are not one

of the things that commissioners have jurisdiction over.
I don't believe— I don't know this for a fact,
but my belief is a commissioner cannot marry someone unless
they happen to be a marriage commissioner authorized by the
clerk of the Court.

I don't know.

I haven't researched

that issue, but it certainly is an issue.

I thought a

1

commissioner's jurisdiction was limited to those items that

2

were specifically delegated under the rules of

3

administrative procedure.

4

those matters.

5

the question of why this was not addressed first or earlier.

6

It certainly wasn't because of a problem with my calendar or

7

my unavailability.

8
9
10

I donft think this is one of

But even laying that aside, I cannot answer

The other-- the last thing that I have is a case-I did find one case.

And I didn't have much time to do

this, but —

11

THE COURT:

I understand.

12

MR. MCINTYRE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. MCINTYRE:

If I might approach?

Yes, you may.
I did some really quick research on

15

the equities and the rules with regard to Rule 60(b) being

16

an equitable remedy and whether or not it was appropriate to

17

set aside.

18

But it says, "In deciding whether a default judgment should

19

be set aside"—

I certainly hope that I've found the right rule.

20

THE COURT:

Where are you reading?

21

MR. MCINTYRE:

I'm just reading from the headnote

22

under No. 3, your Honor.

It says, "In deciding whether a

23

default judgment should be set aside, the Court should

24

balance the equities on a case-by-case basis, including such

25

considerations as preference to allowing presentation of all

1

claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the party's

2

conduct, the need for finality of judgments and the

3

respective hardships in denying or granting relief."

4

think the hardship in this case in granting the motion to

5

set aside the default judgment is we're faced with a

6

jurisdictional problem here.

7

loses jurisdiction to determine that there's a valid

8

marriage on the 29th of December.

9

think the case lot is clear, I don't think that there's any

10

I

I believe that this Court

I just don't think-- I

choice in that matter.

11

There is a prejudice to the petitioner if the

12

default judgment is set aside, that is the ultimate

13

prejudice.

14

not done by the 29th of December.

15

having to prepare in very short order for a trial that we

16

didn't think was going to happen.

17

think there was going to be a trial was because the Court

18

had already entered an order declaring that the marriage was

19

valid.

20

Her marriage can never be declared valid if it's
We are in the dilemma of

The reason we didn't

And, frankly, the time that's available for both

21

the Court's calendar and for my calendar is extremely short.

22

I don't mean t o — maybe this isn't a good reason, but it's a

23

practical reason.

24

represent.

25

cases and I have their cases already scheduled and have been

I have other clients that I have to

I have to take my time to be prepared for their

for a long time.
November.

This case was scheduled to be tried in

It wasn't tried in November because Harrington

Trucking defaulted.
Their default-- they are now saying, Well, that's
excusable, we have good reasons for making the default.
Even assume that that's all true, there is no bad conductor there is no conduct on the part of the petitioner that in
any way kept them from coming back before Judge Stirba long
before the 12th of November.
If they wanted to set aside, why didn't they come
in and say, Let's have a hearing on whether or not this
ought to be set aside so that we can still have our hearing
on November 12th.

That was never done.

They wait until the

15th of December and say, Poor me, poor me.

I need to have

the Court accommodate our failure to diligently pursue the
remedy we asked for.

We asked for intervention.

We've been

allowed by the Court to intervene, but we failed to
contravene any of the allegations until the 28th, after the
default had been entered.
So that's the reason that I believe it is
absolutely unfair and prejudicial to my client and that's
why— and I very much appreciate the Court accommodating us
on what is admittedly very short notice.
THE COURT:

I have one procedural question.

In

the file the intervenor does say, in effect, we're not sure

1

what we have to do to oppose this, but we have filed an

2

objection to the petition.

3

need for an answer, does that--

4
5

MR. MCINTYRE:

Is that— does that obviate a

No, it doesn't.

And the reason it

doesn't is that issue was addressed by Judge Stirba.

6

THE COURT:

Okay.

7

MR. MCINTYRE:

That issue was addressed by Judge

8

Stirba in September when she said-- I mean, we brought up

9

the issue.

And my point to the Judge at that point was,

10

Your Honor, I've alleged in my petition all of the-- I just

11

ticked off the statutory requirements for a declaration of a

12

valid marriage.

13

going to deny that Janet Mitchell is able to consent to her

14

own marriage.

15

there's just no reason to deny it.

16

allegations there is a good faith basis for denying and

17

which ones there aren't.

18

an answer to this case, I'm entitled to a default at this

19

point.

20

22nd to file an answer.

It seems pretty clear to me that nobody is

I mean, she's not married to anybody else,
So I need to know what

And because no one else has filed

She said, Well, I'm going to give them until October

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MR. MCINTYRE:

At least that's my recollection of

23

the colloquy that went back and forth before the Court. I

24

don't know that there's any specific order on that.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Kerr.

1

MR. KERR:

First, just to clarify one issue, the

2

hearing on November 12th, I believe was to be before

3

Judge Stirba.

4

little bit and talk to the Court about what actually

5

happened and led up to this default judgment.

6

Okay.

Now, let me-- I'd like to back up a

The motion to intervene was filed way back in

7

April, I believe.

Let me double-check that.

Excuse me.

8

March 24th, 1998.

In April-- on April 7th of 1998,

9

Harrington Trucking, as the Court noticed, filed an

10

objection to the petition for declaration of common law

11

marriage.

12

thereof, was what was an answer.

13

April or May or June or July whether or not we could even

I

14

file an answer.

I

15

intervention, makes no mention of filing an answer.

16

didn't even know, up until the Court's order in October,

17

that we could even file an answer.

18
19
20

And attached to that, the memorandum in support

I

Again, we didn't know in

Rule 24, under which we made the
We

|

j

What happened was we were under an extremely
abbreviated time schedule.
THE COURT:

Let's stop right there for a minute.

21

You say that you didn't know you could file an answer or you

22

didn't understand the rules or the procedures that w e r e —

23

MR. KERR:

It was unclear because our motion to

24

intervene and o u r — really wasn't effectively granted, my

25

understanding, until October.

That was my understanding,

1

because the report and recommendation had been objected to.

2

And it wasn't clear to anyone, I don't think, that we needed

3

to file an answer until October-- until the October order

4

when the judge specifically stated, You need to file an--

5

you need to file an answer on this date.

6

Okay.

But way back in April we'd sort of foreseen this

7

problem and said, Okay, if something comes up, if additional

8

pleading is necessary, we're going to attach this, this will

9

serve as our answer.

The Court will note that the Answer—

10

the Supplementary Answer we filed on the 28th of October is

11

essentially the same, it's in the form of a general denial.

12

So the argument that they didn't have notice that-- what we

13

would be objecting to really is without merit.

14
15

THE COURT:
an answer, not--

16

MR. KERR:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. KERR:

THE COURT:

25

Well, I don't know.

See, my

The Court's order was to file an

answer.

23
24

You couldn't rely on what you'd

understanding—

21
22

That's correct.

already filed.

19
20

But the fact is you were ordered to do

MR. KERR:
too.

Right.

Let me back up a little bit

The attorney who was present on the October hearing—
MR. MCINTYRE:

It's September.

1

MR. KERR:

I'm sorry.

September.

The September

2

hearing was Mr. Williams from our office.

3

is the lead attorney on the case.

4

the pleadings.

5

Exhibit-D.

6

don't know what went on there at that hearing so I can't

7

tell you, but all I know is what's in the Court's order.

8
9

Mr. Christensen

Mr. Christensen filed all

I don't know if Mr. Williams was aware of

Okay.

I don't know if he knew at the time.

I

On to the issue of the abbreviated time schedule,
we have interviewed several witnesses on our own, we've done

10

some informal discovery.

Their— plaintiff's counsel has

11

been very kind in trying to-- was very kind in trying to

12

work it out and we did work out most of the discovery

13

issues.

14

objections to what materials would be going to certain

15

parties.

16

reveal certain materials we got directly from the plaintiff

17

to other parties.

18

over the documents.

There was a delay, however, because there was some

And we sent a letter saying that we wouldn't

19

Once he got that letter, then he turned
But there was some confusion there.

Furthermore, given the tight, tight schedule that

20

we were under, it j u s t — it was simply excusable neglect, it

21

was inadvertence, as the rule specifically states.

22

Rule 60(b), as the petitioner's counsel has correctly

23

indicated, states that-- there are three requirements under

24

Rule 60(b) for granting a motion to set aside default

25

judgement.

Now,

1

Do you mind if I take this?

2

MR. MCINTYRE:

3

MR. KERR:

Oh, no, not at all.

I only made one copy of the Court's—

4

the Report and Recommendation of the commissioner on that.

5

I'd just like to read from that Recommendation, though.

6

states that, "It is the finding of this Court that

7

Harrington Trucking, Inc. has shown all of the requirements

8

for setting aside default judgment under Rule 60(b)."

9

Then it specifically mentions certain things.

10

reading from paragraph A.

11

Trucking has shown that this motion to set aside was

12

timely."

13

It

I'm

"Specifically, Harrington

I actually went down and printed out a copy of the

14

docket from the day, the 28th, when we filed our motion.

15

think it's interesting to note that on the docket from this

16

Court, 10-28-98 filed Answer to Verified Petition for

17

Judicial Declaration.

18

support a motion to set aside default.

19

certificate is actually entered in after.

20

timely we were.

21

before— I assume— I presume that the dates and the order

22

has some relevance to when they actually received it down at

23

the clerk's office.

24

petitioner got their default certificate filed with the

25

clerk.

I

I

There was also a memorandum to
The default
So that's how

We got our motion and our Answer in

We actually got ours in before the

On the same day, that's how timely it was.

Second, \tfe've shown that it was because of

1
2

excusable neglect.

3

it understandable, at the very least, as to why someone

4

would forget to fi.le the answer.

5

The abbreviated discovery schedule made

And fina Lly, Harrington Trucking has shown that

6

there is a meritorious defense to this lawsuit.

7

interviewed severa 1 witnesses, we have several-- we've

8

obtained documents for discovery which question the validity

9

of this marriage.

10

We've

Therefore, there is clearly a meritorious

defense here.

11

I'd like to back up a little bit and talk about

12

what happened when we filed our motion to set aside.

13

personally brought that motion here to the court.

14

personally filed i-t with the clerk.

15

copies and brought them to Judge Stirba.

16

that time, had already left due to her incapacity.

17

to her clerk.

18

down to Commissioner Arnett.

19

shouldn't this be ]heard before a Judge?

20

believe this should go down to Commissioner Arnett.

21

the file, I don't ]have it anymore, you can't give me

22

anything.

23

I

I

I personally took
Judge Stirba, at
I talked

Her clerk informed me that it was being sent
I said, Why, you know,
She said, No, I

I walked to Commissioner Arnett's office.

He has

I filed

24

a courtesy copy wi th Commissioner Arnett of the motion to

25

set aside default.

I looked at his calendar.

Initially,

1

there was a date on December 4th of this year, but that was

2

the first one.

3

However, 'there was scheduling difficulty and I had to click

4

it back to December 16th.

5

could because I realized that we needed to get this resolved

6

as soon as possible.

7

on my own personal knowledge of what I actually did.

8

it as quickly as I could.

So, again, that's after November 12th.

But, again, I did it as soon as I

I was not-- and I can say this based
I did

Now, as to the issue of the November 12th hearing,

9
10

we were ready and wanted to go forward on November 12th.

11

were prepared to go forward on November 12th

12

going, we had everything lined up.

13

I'm sorry

14

set aside default judgement.

16

However, the defendant—

I don't know--

Wait a minute.

Who filed the

motion to set aside?
MR. KERR:

17
18

We were

The petitioner decided to file this motion to

MR. MCINTYRE:

15

We

I'm sorry.

The default judgement.

The

petitioner filed for a default judgment.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. KERR:

That was in October.
That was in October, on the 28th of

I-- I think that the argument can certainly be

21

October.

22

made that that is what led to this problem.

23

didn't dec3ide to file the default judgement--- or default

24

stipli (sic), they did.

25

realized, I think, that given the short peric3d of time that

We didn't— we

And given— they sheDuld have

1

we had, that we were going to file a motion for excusable

2

neglect.

3

want to go forward with this November 12th hearing on the

4

merits.

5

And that for whatever reason, they didn't really

I think that's important because the Supreme Court

6

has stated very clearly that the presumption should be in

7

favor of hearing a case on the merits.

8

read a brief statement from the Supreme Court on this issue.

9

This is in the case of-- this is in the briefs, by the way.

I'd just like to

10

It's Interstate Excavating, Inc. vs. Angola Development, 611

11

P 2nd, 369 Utah, 1980.

12

The Supreme Court states, "Where there is doubt

13

about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt

14

should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that

15

each party may have an opportunity to present his side of

16

the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance

17

with law and justice."

18

We are willing to go forward anytime the Court

19

wants to between now and the 29th, if that's an issue.

20

We've also stated that this one-year time limitation-- and

21

I'll state it here again— I don't know if it's

22

jurisdictional or if it's in the matter of the statute of

23

limitations, which can be waived.

24

as an affirmative defense if we decide to have the hearing

25

in January, for example.

We will not bring it up

I've checked with that, with our

1

client, and they'ie fine with that.

2

forward at any time on the merits of this action, because we

3

believe that the merits will clearly show that Ms. Robins

4

was not the common 1 aw spouse of Mr. Mitchell.

5

THE COURT:

We are willing to go

Tell me, why does this proceeding

6

matter to your clierit, as opposed to challenging this in

7

another action.

8
9

MR. KERR:

We can't challenge it in another

action.

10

THE COURT:

Well, you can't challenge her

11

marriage.

12

between her and her family?

13

But whethter she's married or not, isn't that

MR. KERR:

Well, we weren't going to until some

14

certain information came to light.

15

heirs came to us.

16

filed, ca. wrongful death action, by certain heirs of

17

Mr. Mitchell.

18

that Mr . Mitchell was never married to Ms. -Robins.

19

Okay.

Some of the other

By the way, there's already an action

Certain of those heirs came to us and stated

THE COURT:

Even so, isn't that the prerogative of

20

the heirs to come tc> this action instead of you come on

21

behalf <of them?

22
23
24
25

MR. KERR:

I don't why they didn't.

But also,

this really is a matter o f — on the motion to intervene.
THE COURT:

And it's been granted.

asking itfhat this is based on.

I'm just

1

MR. KERR:

Oh, why are we doing it?

We don't

2

believe Ms. Mitchell-- or Ms. Robins is an heir.

3

isn't an heir, she's not entitled to recovery under the

4

wrongful death statute.

5
6

THE COURT:

MR. KERR:
it.

THE COURT:

She's not a party to the wrongful

death petition.

11
12

This is the only day that we can bring

That issue can only be brought in this proceeding.

9
10

MR. KERR:

That's right.

THE COURT:

14

MR. KERR:

Okay.
And I think that was the issue that was

15

decided.

16

default should be entered.

17

Really, we're only here to decide whether or not

THE COURT:

MR. KERR:

20

THE COURT:

Anytime that the Court wishes to do so.
How long do you propose this would

MR. MCINTYRE:

Your Honor, I guess the problem

that I have is that I hadn't anticipated this, b u t —

24
25

So you're prepared to try

take in terms of time?

22
23

All right.

this anytime between now and the 28th?

19

21

That's why we had to

bring a motion to intervene, which was previously granted.

13

18

But I'm saying, isn't that

really a matter for another date?

7
8

Yes.

And if she

THE COURT:
how long—

I know.

But if we were to hear this,

1

MR. MCINTYRE:

I think it was previously set by

2

Judge Stirba for a full day, and so I would think it would

3

take a full day.

4

MR. KERR:

I believe that's--

5

MR. MCINTYRE:

6

time, that was mine at the time.

7

responses to their point.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. MCINTYRE:

10

I mean, I have some

I'm not ruling, I'm just asking.
I know.

My estimation would be

about a day.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KERR:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. KERR:

15

That was her estimation at the

questions.

Do you agree, Mr. Kerr?
I believe that is accurate, yes.
Are you through or did y o u —
Yes, unless you have any more

Thank you.

16

THE COURT:

Mr. Mclntyre, do you have a response?

17

MR. Mclntyre:

18

First of all, the disadvantage.

I do, your Honor.
I mean, the

19

disadvantage is having to try the case on short notice.

20

Now, they're saying, Well, that was the reason that our

21

neglect is excusable was because we had a very short

22

discovery schedule, but at least they knew about it.

23

they had not just the month of the October.

24

hearing was held on September 18th.

25

And

I mean, the

Judge Stirba entered an order on September 18th

1

that said, If you want to file an answer, do it within-- and

2

I believe it was 40 days.

3

answer a complaint, they had more than enough time to file

4

an answer.

5

filed a motion, and we filed our motion and sent them a copy

6

of it way before the time they filed their motion to set

7

aside the judgment.

Not the normal 20 that you get to

They didn't do it.

I suspect that if we hadn't

8

Now, in terms of heirs who have come to them and

9

said they objected because Mrs. Mitchell wasn't married to

10

Mr. Mitchell, every heir that I know of-- and I represent

11

the estate— every heir that I know of signed an affidavit

12

in support of the petition.

13

aware of that.

14

else.

So if they've recanted, I'm not

But I just don't know that there is anybody

15

And at this point, as I say, the prejudice is in

16

the preparation time and I don't know how we resolve that.

17

And somebody is going to be prejudiced here.

18

to whether or not Harrington Trucking is really prejudiced,

19

what their claim is is that they will have a more difficult

20

burden if they chose in the wrongful death case to oppose

21

the claim made by Mrs. Mitchell as an heir.

22

is the personal representative for the estate, she is the

23

heir under Mr. Mitchell's will.

24

declaration.

25

With respect

Mrs. Mitchell

She is his wife under this

Now, if they want to claim that this declaration

1

of common law marriage was not made after a trial on the

2

merit, they're entitled to make that argument.

3

of the prejudice to either party, the greater prejudice is

4

to Mrs. Mitchell by setting aside the default, as opposed to

5

the prejudice that's visited upon Harrington Trucking.

So I don't—

6

And let's not lose sight of the fact that it's

7

Harrington Trucking that killed Mrs. Mitchell's husband.

8

She was in the vehicle to see Dennis Mitchell die. And

9

they're the ones who are coming into Court saying, Gee, this

10

Court shouldn't declare the marriage valid.

And if we don't

11

have the hearing before the 29th, the Court may lose the

12

power to do it.

13

not.

14

courts have ruled that the jurisdictional requirements of

15

the statute may not be waived.

I don't know whether it can be waived or

My frank opinion is that our courts— our appellate

16

And I just feel very uncomfortable being put in a

17

position where I have to try a case on such extremely short

18

notice, without time to prepare, or I have to sacrifice the

19

interests of other clients.

20

in a two-man law office.

21

come in and help me out to a great deal because my partner

22

is as busy as I am.

23

mean, contested divorce matters in front of Judge Iwasaki

24

next week.

25

as this hearing was over, I planned to use that as part of

I'm put into a position— I'm

I don't have somebody that can

I've got trials that are scheduled— I

I had planned to use today or even right as soon

1

my prep time because Ifve got other transcripts.

2

So I'm in a real disadvantage and it's a real
Not only that, ITve gone from a position-- or

3

disadvantage.

4

my client has gone from a position where she has a judicial

5

declaration that her marriage was valid, to a position where

6

she has the burden of proof, if this judgment is set aside.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. KERR:

9

Okay.
Your Honor, could I make two quick

points?

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. KERR:

Briefly.

I

First, the discovery cutoff for this

j

12

matter was actually on November 19th, which was before the ;

13

date the.petitioner filed the default judgment.

14

preparation should have, for the large part, been completed.

15

So all the i

Second, they stated that we can always oppose the j

16

finding of thr s Court in a later proceeding.

17

not true.

18

is the proper forum to make a final determination of the

19

status of Ms. Robins' relationship with Mr. Mitchell.

20

That's really

We'll be barred by a collateral estoppel.

MR. MCINTYRE:

This

Your Honor, that's just not true.

21

The discovery cutoff was October 19th. We mailed on October

22

27th the default.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

The Court is ready to order, if

24

you're ready to hear.

And it's t h e — I'd like you to know,

25

I don't know if this is going to matter on any of the order,

1

but, again, that we did go through the file.

2

file and I know what?s in it and I know the history.

3

appreciate your background.

4
5

I read the
I

But the order of the Court will be to reverse the
-recommendation of finding of the commissioner for the

6

following reasons and reinstate the default judgment against

7

the intervenor— and tell me the trucking company.

8

sorry.

9

MR. KERR:

10

THE COURT:

I'm

Harrington Trucking.
—

Harrington Trucking, for the

11

following reasons.

The Court's order previously ordered

12

Harrington Trucking to file an answer if they were going to

13

answer, by-- and help me with the dates. October--

14

MR. KERR:

15

THE COURT:

October 22nd, I believe.
October 22nd, which was 41 days from

16

the time of the entry of the order.

The order did— also

17

set an abbreviated discovery schedule.

18

because of both of those items, the additional length of

19

time granted to answer and the shortened discovery schedule

20

should have— did not give Harrington Trucking excusable

21

neglect.

22

notice, on a heightened notice, that they were to answer

23

because of the specificity of the order.

24

timely and there may be cause, but it was not based on

25

excusable neglect.

And based on that,

If anything, it should have put them on more

It may have been

1

Also, the provisions of Rule 60(b) do address the

2

issue of prejudice.

And because of the jurisdictional

3

nature of the statute, which says that this common law

4

marriage must be established within one year, that time is

5

running.

6

schedule of the counsel, that cannot be compiled with

7

without undue hardship and prejudice to the petitioner at

8

this point, and because other avenues exist.

9

may have an impact, is what Harrington Trucking stated in

10

its petition— its objection to its petition and into its

11

answer.

12

grounds to outweigh the prejudice, the actual prejudice that

13

will be sustained by the petitioner in this action.

And because of the schedule of the Court and the

It may have an adverse effect is not sufficient

14

Do you need anything further?

15

MR. MCINTYRE:

16

MR. KERR:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. KERR:

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

I

Because this

No.

Thank you, your Honor.

Thank you, your Honor.
Will you prepare the order?
I will, your Honor.
oooOooo

Thank you,

1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2
3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF UTAH

) ss,

5

)

I, JANET LOVELESS, do herby certify that the

6

foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 30, contain a true and

7

accurate transcript of the electronically recorded

8

proceedings and was transcribed by me to the best of my

9

ability from the tape furnished to me.

10
11

DATED:

March 15th, 1999

12
13
14

Jacfet L o v e l e s s , RPR, CSR

15
16

My Commission E x p i r e s
m~*+.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

i i m tk m

JANET LOVELESS
Notary Public
State of Utah
My Comm. Expires Jan 2,2002
476 N 750 East Lindon UT 84042

APPENDIX E

UT ST § 30-1-4.5, Validity of marriage not solemnized
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(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;

Utah Code § 30-1-4.5

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 1. MARRIAGE

(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(e) who hold themselves out as and have
acquired a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.
§ 30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not
solemnized
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized
according to this chapter shall be legal and valid
if a court or administrative order establishes that
it arises out of a contract between two consenting
parties who:

(2) The determination or establishment of a
marriage under this section must occur during
the relationship described in Subsection (1), or
within one year following the termination of that
relationship.
Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be
manifested in any form, and may be proved
under the same general rules of evidence as facts
in other cases.
As enacted by Chapter 246, Laws of Utah 1987.

(a) are capable of giving consent;
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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APPENDIX F

RCP Rule 60, RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
*128 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR
ORDER
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its
own initiative or on the motion of any party and
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes
may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes;
Inadvertence;
Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated
intrinsic
or
extrinsic),
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misrepresentation or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),
not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
[Amended effective April 1, 1998.]
Advisory Committee Note
*129 The 1998 amendment eliminates as
grounds for a motion the following: "(4) when,
for any cause, the summons in an action has not
been personally served upon the defendant as
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action." This basis for a
motion is not found in the federal rule. The
committee concluded the clause was ambiguous
and possibly in conflict with rules permitting
service by means other than personal service.
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APPENDIX G

RCP Rule 8, RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADINGS
*17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8

WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS,
AND ORDERS
Current with amendments received through
11-1-98

RULE 8. GENERAL
PLEADINGS

RULES

OF

(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types
may be demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall
state in short and plain terms his defenses to each
claim asserted and shall admit or deny the
averments upon which the adverse party relies.
If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment, he shall so state and this has the effect
of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the
substance of the averments denied. When a
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part
or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify
so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader
intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, he may
make his denials as specific denials of designated
averments or paragraphs, or he may generally
deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits;
but, when he does so intend to controvert all its
averments, he may do so by general denial
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.

In pleading to a

Page 1

preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the
court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat
the pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation.
*18 (d) Effect of Failure to Deny. Averments
in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required, other than those as to the amount of
damage, are admitted when not denied in the
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to
which no responsive pleading is required or
permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided.
(e) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct;
Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms
of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and
one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient
by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on
legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All
statements shall be made subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
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FRCP Rule 8, General Rules of Pleading
* 19740 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule

8
UNITED STATES CODE
ANNOTATED
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS
III. PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS
Amendments received to 8-21-98
Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of
the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction
and the claim needs no new grounds of
jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment
for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
(b) Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall
state in short and plain terms the party's defenses
to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny
the averments upon which the adverse party
relies. If a party is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment, the party shall so state and
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly
meet the substance of the averments denied.
When a pleader intends in good faith to deny
only a part or a qualification of an averment, the
pleader shall specify so much of it as is true and
material and shall deny only the remainder.
Unless the pleader intends in good faith to
controvert all the averments of the preceding
pleading, the pleader may make denials as
specific denials of designated averments or
paragraphs or may generally deny all the
averments except such designated averments or
paragraphs as the pleader expressly admits; but,
when the pleader does so intend to controvert all
its averments, including averments of the
grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
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depends, the pleader may do so by general denial
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(c) Affirmative Defenses.
In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration
and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches,
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any
other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
When a party has
mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the
court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat
the pleading as if there had been a proper
designation.
* 19741 (d) Effect of Failure to Deny.
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required, other than those as to the
amount of damage, are admitted when not denied
in the responsive pleading. Averments in a
pleading to which no responsive pleading is
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
avoided.
(e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct;
Consistency.
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms
of pleading or motions are required.
(2) A party may set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or
in separate counts or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and
one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient
by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state
as many separate claims or defenses as the
party has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal, equitable, or maritime grounds.
All statements shall be made subject to the
obligations set forth in Rule 11.
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings
shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.
CREDIT(S)
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<General Materials (GM) - References,
Annotations, or Tables>
HISTORICAL NOTES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
1937 Adoption
Note to Subdivision (a). See [former] Equity Rules 25
(Bill of Complaint-Contents), and 30 (Answer-ContentsCounterclaim). Compare 2 Ind.Stat.Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§
2-1004, 2-1015; 2 Ohio Gen.Code Ann. (Page, 1926) §§
11305, 11314; Utah Rev.Stat.Ann. (1933) §§ 104-7-2,
104-9-1.
See Rule 19(c) for the requirement of a statement in a
claim for relief of the names of persons who ought to be
parties and the reason for their omission.
See Rule 23(b) for particular requirements as to the
complaint in a secondary action by shareholders.
Note to Subdivision (b). 1. This rule supersedes the
methods of pleading prescribed in U.S.C., Title 19, § 508
(Persons making seizures pleading general issue and
proving special matter); U.S.C Title 35, [former] §§ 40d
(Proving under general issue, upon notice, that a statement
in application for an extended patent is not true), 69 [now
282] (Pleading and proof in actions for infringement) and
similar statutes.
* 19742 2. This rule is, in part, [former] Equity Rule 30
(Answer—Contents-Counterclaim), with the matter on
denials largely from the Connecticut practice. See Conn.
Practice Book (1934) §§ 107, 108, and 122;
Conn.Gen.Stat. (1930) §§ 5508 to 5514. Compare the
English practice, English Rules Under the Judicature Act
(The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r.r. 17-20.
Note to Subdivision (c). This follows substantially
English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual
Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 15 and N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 242,
with "surprise" omitted in this rule.
Note to Subdivision (d). The first sentence is similar to
former Equity Rule 30 (Answer-Contents-Counterclaim).
For the second sentence see former Equity Rule 31
(Reply-When Required-When Cause at Issue). This is
similar to English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The
Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r.r. 13, 18; and to the
practice of the States.
Note to Subdivision (e). This rule is an elaboration upon
[former]
Equity
Rule
30 (Answer-Contents-
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Counterclaim), plus a statement of the actual practice under
some codes. Compare also [former] Equity Rule 18
(Pleadings-Technical Forms Abrogated). See Clark, Code
Pleading (1928), pp. 171-4, 432-5; Hankin, Alternative
and Hypothetical Pleading (1924), 33 Yale L.J. 365.
Note to Subdivision (f). A provision of like import is of
frequent occurrence in the codes. Smith-Hurd 111. Stats, ch.
110, § 157(3); 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9266;
N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 275; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913)
§ 7458.
1966 Amendment
The change here is consistent with the broad purposes of
unification.
1987 Amendment
The amendments are technical. No substantive change is
intended.

REFERENCES
CROSS REFERENCES
Amendment of pleadings generally, see Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rulel5,28USCA.
Defenses in law or fact, how presented, see Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc. Rule 12, 28 USCA.
Forms, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Form 1 et seq., 28 USCA.
Joinder of claims, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 18, 28
USCA.
Relief granted in judgment even if not demanded, see
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 54, 28 USCA.
* 19743 Reply to counterclaims denominated as such, see
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. Rule 7, 28 USCA.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law
Complaint and answer, see Koch, Administrative Law and
Practice § 8.43 et seq.
Petition to commence suit, form of, see West's Federal
Practice Manual § 1896.
Preparation of complaint, see West's Federal Practice
Manual § 7955.
American Digest System
Federal civil procedure; affirmative defense or avoidance,
see Federal Civil Procedure <@=>751 et seq.
Federal civil procedure; answer; failure to deny, see
Federal Civil Procedure <@=>745.
Federal civil procedure; answer in general, see Federal
Civil Procedure <®=>731 et seq.
Federal civil procedure; complaint in general, see Federal
Civil Procedure <®==?671 et seq.
Federal civil procedure; construction of pleadings in
general, see Federal Civil Procedure <®=>654.
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Federal civil procedure; simplicity, conciseness, and
directness of pleadings in general, see Federal Civil
Procedure <®=:?631 et seq.
Encyclopedias
Federal civil procedure; affirmative defense or avoidance,
see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 306 et seq.
Federal civil procedure; answer; admissions; failure to
deny, see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 305.
Federal civil procedure; answer in general, see C.J.S.
Federal Civil Procedure § 301 et seq.
Federal civil procedure; complaint in general, see C.J.S.
Federal Civil Procedure § 262 et seq.
Federal civil procedure;
construction of pleadings;
conclusiveness, see C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure §
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258.
Federal civil procedure; simplicity, conciseness, and
directness of pleadings in general, see C.J.S. Federal
Civil Procedure § 254.
Forms
Action against U.S., complaints, see West's Federal Forms
§ 1771 etseq.
Actions by U.S. to enforce or protect its rights, see West's
Federal Forms § 1791 et seq.
Affirmative defenses, see West's Federal Forms § 2060 et
seq.
Answers in admiralty claims, see West's Federal Forms §
10783 etseq.
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